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Approx. 13,000 words 1 
 2 
A Different Tale of Judicial Power: Administrative Review as a 3 
Problematic Response to the Judicialisation of Tribunals 4 
 5 
 6 
Administrative review involves the reconsideration of an administrative decision by a different 7 
official within the same public body. Administrative review has operated in various contexts for 8 
years, but the rate of its recent expansion has been remarkable. Two systems have been key to this 9 
rapid growth. TｴW ｷﾐデヴﾗS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa けﾏ;ﾐS;デﾗヴ┞ ヴWIﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐげ ｷﾐ ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ decision-making 10 
requires that benefit claimants must first seek administrative review before appealing to a tribunal. 11 
In immigration, long-established appeal rights have been replaced entirely by administrative review. 12 
The volume of disputes channelled through administrative review far exceeds that of tribunals and 13 
makes judicial review appear esoteric. This is a radical change to how people access and experience 14 
justice in the public law context. For the last fifty years and more, individuals in receipt of a negative 15 
administrative decision could appeal directly to independent and judicial tribunals to determine 16 
their legal rights and entitlements to social security benefits and immigration status. The rationale 17 
for this fundamental shift is clear: the increase in tribunal caseloads, austerity, and political factors 18 
(the desire to reduce social security spending and immigration rates) have prompted the 19 
Government to reduce the number the cases proceeding to tribunals by greater use of 20 
administrative review. Within the longer arc of administrative justice developments, we suggest that 21 
administrative review can be conceived as a consequence of the ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ﾗ┘ﾐ progressive 22 
judicialisation of tribunalsねand the related increases in both cost and time. Government 23 
departments have argued that administrative review can provide people with an efficient and 24 
quicker way of correcting case-working errors and thereby reducing unnecessary appeals. On the 25 
other hand, there are concerns about the effectiveness of administrative review as a redress 26 
mechanism and whether it weakens the ability of people to challenge decisions. 27 
2 
 
This article argues that administrative review に as it currently operates - is a problematic 28 
response to the judicialisation of tribunals in recent decades. The overall effect of the operation of 29 
administrative review has been to weaken the ability of people to secure redress against 30 
administrative decisions. The first part discusses the need for justice within administrative decision-31 
making and the development of tribunals. The second part turns to the recent expansion of 32 
administrative review. The third part considers the practical operation of administrative review in 33 
both the social security and immigration contexts. In the fourth part, we assess administrative 34 
review and suggest ways of enhancing its effectiveness. We conclude by considering the wider 35 
constitutional implications of this development of administrative review. In particular, we suggest 36 
this episode of de-judicialisation provides insight into nature of judicial power in the UK public law 37 
system. In contrast to the standard, high-profile debate about the growth of judicial power and the 38 
ヴｷゲW ﾗa さﾃ┌ヴｷゲデﾗIヴ;I┞ざ, the recent experience of administrative review tells a different tale. The 39 
greater use of administrative review has gone hand-in-hand with a correspondingly smaller role for 40 
the judicial control of government. 41 
 42 
Administrative decision-making and the judicialisation of tribunals 43 
The basic need for administrative justice begins with primary administrative decision-making and its 44 
impact upon people. Justice within initial-decision is the most important form of justice in terms of 45 
volume. All decision-making starts に and most of it finishes に here. Government departments, such 46 
as the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) and the Home Office make millions of 47 
individualised decisions each year to determine ヮWﾗヮﾉWげゲ WﾐデｷデﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ and to implement policy. Such 48 
bodies are variants of a particular organisational model: the machine bureaucracy. That is, a large 49 
heavily-staffed organisation that undertakes a vast number of repetitive operating tasks through 50 
routinized and formalised procedures.
1
 The basic legitimating value of this model is the ability to 51 
                                                          
1
 H. Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1979), pp.314-347. Cf. 
M;ゲｴ;┘げゲ ﾏﾗSWﾉ ﾗa けH┌ヴW;┌Iヴ;デｷI ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷデ┞げぎ Jく M;ゲｴ;┘が Bureaucratic Justice: Manging Social Security 
Disability Claims (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983), pp. 25-26. 
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process a massive volume of decisions efficiently and accurately. Given their technical superiority, 52 
administrative bureaucracies are often the only viable means of managing large-scale social issues 53 
and for implementing democratically-mandated policy goals.
2
 54 
The ideal model of machine bureaucracy assumes the rational, accurate and efficient 55 
implementation of policy. In practice, administrative bureaucracies are often afflicted by 56 
dysfunctional behaviour, which constrains their capacity to make robust decisions. Government 57 
agencies are subject to intense political pressures, overwhelmed with individualised decision-58 
making, and are administratively unstable. These dysfunctional aspects often have tragic 59 
consequences for those who interact with government. Caseworkers have to make complex, 60 
sensitive, and morally-demanding decisions that are often life-changing for the individuals involved.
3
 61 
For instance, is a benefit claimant unable to work for health or disability reasons? Is a foreign 62 
national entitled to leave to enter to join a family member already present in the UK? Yet, 63 
government bodies frequently operate in an impersonal, bureaucratic, and rule-bound manner. The 64 
often けH┞┣;ﾐデｷﾐW IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ｷデ┞げ ﾗa ;Sﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗W ヴ┌ﾉWゲ ヴWaﾉWIデゲ ; ｴ┞ヮWr-legalism in which their frequent 65 
misapplication is inevitable.
4
 Weighed down by the both the volume of decisions they have to make 66 
and processing targets, caseworkers often apply the rules not as a means to an end but as an end in 67 
themselves. The mechanical application of the rules to a wide variety of citizens and circumstances 68 
can result in arbitrary, insensitive, and incorrect decisions. Mistakes and errors may arise either 69 
because of unintentional carelessness, oversights, and communication issues or from ill-intentioned 70 
bias. 71 
                                                          
2
 Government does not have a monopoly of decision-making. Over recent years, government has increasingly 
outsourced functions to private providers to reduce costs. For instance, health care professional reports used 
in benefit decision-making are produced by private providers. 
3
 B. Zacka, When the State Meets Street (Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 2017). 
4
 Pokhriyal v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1568, [4] (Jackson LJ), on the 
complexity of the Immigration Rules. 
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The variable or poor quality of administrative decisions and their implications for claimants 72 
is a long-standing theme of administrative justice.
5
 Representatives and advocacy groups have 73 
frequently criticised the poor quality of government decisions. Recent tribunal decisions illustrate 74 
the mix of intense concern and bafflement at chaotic procedures and poor decisions: け[e]very 75 
working day, the First-tier Tribunal overturns decisions of the Secretary of State because the 76 
decision maker has omitted to consider all the relevant issues;
6
 けぷ┞へet another case in which the 77 
removal of an award of the Personal Independence Payment was not dealt with in any sense 78 
adequatelyげき7 け┞Wデ ;ﾐﾗデｴWヴ I;ゲW ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ デhe putative appellant and the First-tier Tribunal was misled 79 
H┞ HM ‘W┗Wﾐ┌W わ C┌ゲデﾗﾏゲ ;ﾐS ｷデゲ SWaWIデｷ┗W ヮヴﾗIWS┌ヴWゲ ぐ A IﾗﾏHｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa K;aﾆ; ;ﾐS C;ヮデ;ｷﾐ 80 
Mainwaring might be thought unlikely to come up with such ; ゲﾗヴヴ┞ ゲデ;デW ﾗa ;aa;ｷヴゲくげ8 Similarly, 81 
immigration decision ﾉWデデWヴゲ aヴWケ┌Wﾐデﾉ┞ けSﾗ ﾐﾗデ ゲ┌aaｷIｷWﾐデﾉ┞ ヴWﾉ┞ ﾗﾐ デｴW ﾉ;┘ ;ﾐS ｪ┌ｷS;ﾐIWげ ヴWﾉW┗;ﾐデ デﾗ 82 
the decision.
9
 Clearly administrative performance varies, but at its worst poor service includes 83 
inflexible attitudes, incomprehensible decision letters, aggressive enforcement, and downright 84 
incompetence. The need for effective control of machine bureaucracies, and redress for those 85 
subject to their decisions, is clear. 86 
 For the last century and more, the principal remedy for challenging routine administrative 87 
decisions has been to allow affected individuals to appeal to tribunals. The overarching ethos of 88 
tribunals has long been swift, inexpensive, and uncomplicated access to justice. The task of tribunals 89 
is to undertake a full examination of the merits of a claim, whether for benefits or an immigration 90 
status. Unlike when courts conduct judicial review, tribunals exercise a fact-finding function and can 91 
substitute their own decisions. An equally important feature of tribunals is their emphasis upon 92 
                                                          
5
 Nく WｷﾆWﾉW┞が けF┌デ┌ヴW DｷヴWIデｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ TヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉゲぎ A UﾐｷデWS KｷﾐｪSﾗﾏ PWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wげ ｷﾐ ‘く CヴW┞ﾆW ふWSくぶが Tribunals in the 
Common Law World (Sydney: Federation Press, 2008), pp.175-184; Administrative Justice and Tribunals 
Council, Right First Time (2011). 
6
 RR v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (JSA) [2017] UKUT 50 (AAC), [39]. 
7
 PM v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (PIP) [2017] UKUT 37 (AAC), [1]. 
8
 DG v HMRC and EG (TC) [2016] UKUT 505 (AAC), [1]-[2]. See also JW v HMRC (TC) [2015] UKUT 359 (AAC), [1]: 
け┞Wデ ;ﾐﾗデｴWヴ I;ゲW デｴ;デ a;ﾉﾉゲ ｷﾐデﾗ デｴW ﾉｷデ;ﾐ┞ ﾗa I;ゲWゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ デｴW SヴW;Sa┌ﾉ ケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ ﾗa HM‘Cげゲ ;ヮヮW;ﾉ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ 
the First-デｷWヴ TヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉ ｷゲ ; IWﾐデヴ;ﾉ ｷゲゲ┌Wげく 
9
 House of Lords Constitution Committee, The Legislative Process, 16 November 2016, Oral evidence of Sir 
Ernest Ryder (Senior President of Tribunals), Q 44. 
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adjudication not just as a procedure, but their cultural insistence on an impartial and judicial state of 93 
mind, consistency, and the careful collection and analysis of evidence.
10
 Given the impact of 94 
decisions upon people, the exercise of sound judgement is at the heart of adjudication. Another 95 
crucial feature is the ability of affected persons to participate directly in the decision process.
11
 96 
 Tribunals naturally appeal to a different set of values than bureaucratic administration: 97 
judicial independence; fair procedures; and better-reasoned decisions. Furthermore, administrative 98 
decision-making processes operate in the context of an unequal relationship between claimants and 99 
ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデく けOﾐW-ゲｴﾗデデWヴげ Iﾉ;ｷﾏ;ﾐデゲ go up directly ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ けヴWヮW;デ-ヮﾉ;┞Wヴげ ヮ┌HﾉｷI HﾗSｷWゲ ┘ｴｷIｴ 100 
operate large, monolithic, and monopolistic processes.
12
 The latter benefit not just from experience 101 
of the system, but also influence its design.
13
 Given this fundamental inequality, tribunals provide a 102 
counterweight to the routinised, rigid, and impersonal processing of decisions. In hearings, tribunals 103 
meet claimants face-to-face and use their expertise and inquisitorial procedures to draw out 104 
evidence from claimants in order to exercise complex judgment. Just as importantly, given that their 105 
vulnerable clientele are often intimidated by the prospect of legal procedures, tribunals try to 106 
cultivate an atmosphere in which claimants could feel confident about explaining personal aspects of 107 
their lives. It is important to note that tribunals do not themselves dispense uniformly high 108 
standards of justice: tribunals are far from perfect. There have been instances of glaring failures by 109 
tribunals to act fairly and in accordance with legal principles. Some have a tendency to be highly 110 
adversarial and some tribunals hearings are significantly delayed. Moreover, in recent year the 111 
courts have been questioning the fairness of some appeals procedures, such as out of country 112 
appeals in the immigration context.
14
 Nonetheless, generally speaking, adjudication by higher 113 
                                                          
10
 W.A. Robson, Justice and Administrative Law (London: Stevens & Sons, 3
rd
 edn., 1951), pp.360-418; J. Jowell, 
けTｴW LWｪ;ﾉ Cﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉ ﾗa ASﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗W DｷゲIヴWデｷﾗﾐげ ぷヱΓΑンへ PくLく ヱΑΒが ヱΓヴ-200. For the perspective of a tribunal 
ﾃ┌SｪWが ゲWW Nく W;ヴヴWﾐが けTｴW ASﾃ┌SｷI;デｷﾗﾐ G;ヮげ ふヲヰヰヶぶ ヱン J.S.S.L. 110. 
11
 Tribunals, Courts, and Enforcement Act 2007, s 2(3) and the overriding objective in tribunal procedure rules, 
e.g., The Tribunal Procedure (First-tier Tribunal) (Social Entitlement Chamber) Rules (SI 2008/2685), r 2. 
12
 Mく G;ﾉ;ﾐデWヴが けWｴ┞ デｴW さH;┗Wゲざ CﾗﾏW ﾗ┌デ AｴW;Sぎ “ヮWI┌ﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW Lｷﾏｷデゲ ﾗa LWｪ;ﾉ Cｴ;ﾐｪWげ ふヱΓΑヴぶ Γ Law & 
Society Review 95. 
13
 V. Bondy and A. Le Sueur, Designing Redress: A Study About Grievances Against Public Bodies (2012). 
14
 R (Kyarie and Byndloss) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] 1 WLR 2380. 
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qualified tribunal judges results in a higher standard of decision-making compared with that of 114 
pressurised front-line, often junior caseworkers. 115 
The development of tribunals both individually and collectively is not easily summarised, but 116 
a prominent and sustained theme has been judicialisation.
15
 This trend has had various features: 117 
increasingly complex substantive rules; the appointment of legally qualified personnel as tribunal 118 
judges; greater use of representatives; orderly procedures; reasoned decisions; and onward 119 
appeals.
16
 This trend culminated in the creation of the First-tier and Upper Tribunals. Designated as a 120 
superior court of record, the Upper Tribunal is recognised as a specialist and expert body.
17
 The 121 
gradual judicialisation of the tribunals system in recent decades has been largely led and approved 122 
by successive governments. It is also important to note that judicialisation was not an unmitigated 123 
goodねindeed it is ; けヮヴﾗaﾗ┌ﾐSﾉ┞ ;ﾏHｷｪ┌ﾗ┌ゲ SW┗ｷIWげく18 Making tribunals more like courts can 124 
undermine their distinctive role. Legalistic procedures can limit the degree to which claimants can 125 
participate in proceedings. Complex legal rules and Upper Tribunal precedents are often 126 
impenetrable. Nonetheless, judicialised procedures have, on the whole, provided advantages for 127 
claimants in terms of fair process and legal accuracy.
19
 128 
Despite being a creature largely of its own creation, judicialisation raises a different set of 129 
concerns for the governmentねnamely cost, delay, and the frustration of ultimate political 130 
objectives. Since the Franks Report of 1957, the speed and cheapness of tribunals have been their 131 
                                                          
15
 Gく DヴW┘ヴ┞が けTｴW J┌SｷIｷ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa さASﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗Wざ TヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉゲ ｷﾐ デｴW UKぎ Fヴﾗﾏ HW┘;ヴデ デﾗ LWｪｪ;デデげ ふヲヰヰΒぶ ヲΒ 
Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences ヴヵき ‘く Tｴﾗﾏ;ゲが けCurrent Developments in UK Tribunals: 
Cｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWゲ aﾗヴ ASﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗W J┌ゲデｷIWげ ｷﾐ “く N;ゲﾗﾐ ふWSくぶ, Administrative Justice in Wales and Comparative 
Perspectives (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2017). 
16
 C. Harlow and R. Rawlings, Law and Administration (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 3
rd
 edn., 2009), 
p.490. 
17
 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007, s 3(5); R. (Cart) v The Upper Tribunal [2012] 1 AC 663 [40]; AH 
(Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] 1 AC 678; Jones v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal 
Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] 2 AC 48き ‘く C;ヴﾐ┘;デｴが けTribunal JusticeねA NW┘ “デ;ヴデげ ぷヲヰヰΓへ PくLく ヴΒく 
18
 Tく PヴﾗゲゲWヴが けPﾗ┗Wヴデ┞が ISWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞が ;ﾐS LWｪ;ﾉｷデ┞ぎ “┌ヮヮﾉWﾏWﾐデ;ヴ┞ BWﾐWaｷデ AヮヮW;ﾉ TヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉゲ ;ﾐS TｴWｷヴ PヴWSWIWゲゲﾗヴゲげ 
(1977) 4 British Journal of Law and Society 39, 58. 
19
 There is a much wider debate here. See N. Wikeleyが けB┌ヴ┞ｷﾐｪ BWﾉﾉぎ M;ﾐ;ｪｷﾐｪ デｴW J┌SｷIｷ;ﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ 
“WI┌ヴｷデ┞ TヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉゲげ ふヲヰヰヰぶ ヶン M.L.R. 475. 
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principal attractions for government.
20
 Even before the financial crisis of 2007/08, the Government 132 
framed the discussion of tribunals, and administrative justice more broadly, around the concept of 133 
けproportionate dispute resolutionげ.21 In practice, tribunal procedures, with their (current) heavy 134 
reliance on paper documents and hearings, are complex, drawn-out, and inefficient.
22
 However, as 135 
part of its austerity policies, government has imposed large-scale reductions in funding in the justice 136 
system. Much of the current crisis in access to justice stems in large part from legal aid restrictions.
23
 137 
Previously, legal aid had been available for advice (in social security tribunals) or advice and 138 
representation (immigration tribunals), but it is now largely unavailable
24
 prompting the familiar 139 
problem of how litigants in person can be expected to navigate and participate in a legal process.
25
 140 
Yet, the Coalition Government (2010-15) and the subsequent Conservative governments have 141 
focused on reducing public spending and have viewed tribunals as both overloaded and costly. 142 
Appeal fees have been introduced across a range of tribunals, though some have been found to be 143 
unlawful and some planned fee increases have been abandoned.
26
 These restrictions, combined with 144 
the abolition of the Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, have weakened the quality of 145 
administrative justice.
27
 The main response of the Ministry of Justice to such concerns has been to 146 
announce a programme of court and tribunal reform that will introduce digital and online dispute 147 
                                                          
20
 Report of the Committee on Administrative Tribunals and Enquiries (Cmnd 218,1957) (the Franks report). 
21
 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Transforming Public Services: Complaints, Redress and Tribunals (Cm 
6243, ヲヰヰヴぶき Mく ASﾉWヴが けTribunal Reform: Proportionate Dispute Resolution and the Pursuit of Administrative 
J┌ゲデｷIWげ ふヲヰヰヶぶ ヶΓ M.L.R. 958. 
22
 HM Courts and Tribunals Service is currently implementing a digitisation reform programme under which 
tribunal cases would largely be conducted online. See Ministry of Justice, Transforming Our Justice System 
(2016). 
23
 E. Palmer, T. Cornford, A. Guinchard, and Y. Marique (eds.), Access to Justice: Beyond the Policies and Politics 
of Austerity (Oxford: Hart, 2016). 
24
 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. In the immigration context, legal aid remains 
available only for asylum and bail cases. 
25
 The Judicial Working Group on Litigants in Person: Report (ヲヰヱンぶき Hく GWﾐﾐが けDo-it-yourself Law: Access to 
Justice and the Challenge of Self-ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ;デｷﾗﾐげ ふヲヰヱンぶ ンヲ C.J.Q. 411; JUSTICE, Delivering Justice in an Age of 
Austerity (2015). 
26
 Ministry of Justice, Court and Tribunal Fees (Cm 9124, 2015); House of Commons Justice Committee, Courts 
and Tribunals Fees (HC 167 2016-17); R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] 3 WLR 409. 
27
 Administrative Justice and Tribunals Council, Securing Fairness and Redress: Administrative Justice at Risk? 
ふヲヰヱヱぶき Mく ASﾉWヴが けThe Rise and Fall of Administrative Justice に A C;┌デｷﾗﾐ;ヴ┞ T;ﾉWげ ふヲヰヱヲぶ Β Socio-Legal Review 
ヲΒき Nく OげBヴｷWﾐが けAdministrative Justice: A Libertarian Cinderella in Search of an Egalitarian PrincWげ ふヲヰヱヲぶ Βン 
Political Quarterly 494. A new privately-backed Administrative Justice Council has now been set up between 
HMCTS and JUSTICE, a non-governmental organisation. 
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resolution methods into tribunals.
28
 In the meantime, government departments have expanded the 148 
use of administrative review. 149 
 150 
Administrative review 151 
Illustrating the fragmented administrative justice landscape, administrative review schemes have 152 
developed on an ad hoc H;ゲｷゲく IﾐSWWSが aヴﾗﾏ ﾗﾐW ヮWヴゲヮWIデｷ┗Wが け;Sﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗W ヴW┗ｷW┘げ ｷゲ ; I;デIｴ-all 153 
phrase to cover a wide miscellany of systems. In the context of the Social Fund (abolished in 2013), 154 
there operated a distinctive scheme under which initial decisions were reviewed by a functionally 155 
separate body, the Independent Review Service. Despite its controversial origins, this scheme 156 
developed a strong reputation for providing an independent, expert, timely, and high quality 157 
service.
29
 Since 2009, tax decisions can be challenged either by way of administrative review or 158 
tribunal appeal.
30
 In 2011, school exclusion appeals were downgraded to review panels.
31
 159 
Administrative review also operated at the preliminary pre-protocol stages of judicial review 160 
litigation in which many claims are settled out of court.
32
 Tables 1 and 2 provide detail on social 161 
security and immigration reviews and appeals. 162 
 163 
164 
                                                          
28
 Ministry of Justice, Transforming Our Justice System (2016) 15. For discussion on the progress of these 
reforms so far, see: National Audit Office, Early progress in transforming courts and tribunals (2017-19 HC 
1001). For discussion on tribunals reform in particular, see: R. Thomas and J. Tomlinson, The Digitalisation of 
Tribunals: What we know and what we need to know (Public Law Project and UK Administrative Justice 
Institute, 2018). 
29
 Social Fund Commissioner, Annual Report 2012/2013 (2013). 
30
 The Transfer of Tribunal Functions and Revenue and Customs Appeals Order (SI 2009/56). 
31
 Education Act 2011, s 4. 
32
 Vく BﾗﾐS┞ ;ﾐS Mく “┌ﾐﾆｷﾐが け“WデデﾉWﾏWﾐデ ｷﾐ J┌SｷIｷ;ﾉ ‘W┗ｷW┘ PヴﾗIWWSｷﾐｪゲげ ぷヲヰヰΓへ PL ヲンΑく 
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Table 1: Administrative review schemes 165 
 Social Security Immigration 
Basic design Administrative review 
is mandatory before 
proceeding to a 
tribunal 
Administrative 
review has replaced 
most appeal rights 
Who reviews? A different decision-
maker 
A different decision-
maker 
Legal basis Secondary legislation Immigration Rules 
and administrative 
guidance 
Time limit for 
requesting 
review 
30 days, with scope 
to extend for good 
reason; can appeal to 
a tribunal if request 
to extend is refused
33
 
28 days for overseas 
decisions; 14 days 
for decisions taken 
in the UK; 7 days for 
detainees 
Scope of 
review 
Revision on any 
grounds: to 
reconsider the 
decision afresh 
To resolve case-
working errors 
Review 
procedure 
Paper-based. 
Reviewers may 
telephone claimants 
to explain decisions 
and collect additional 
evidence 
Paper-based 
Range of 
evidence 
considered 
Additional evidence 
can be submitted 
Additional evidence 
cannot be submitted 
Fee No fee £80 fee (refundable) 
Deadline for 
public 
authority to 
undertake 
reviews 
No formal deadline; 
straightforward cases 
expected to be 
completed within 14 
days 
No formal deadline; 
service standard of 
28 days to complete 
reviews 
Onward route 
of challenge 
Tribunal appeal on 
both fact and law 
Judicial review 
Sporadic 
inspection 
Social Security 
Advisory Committee 
(2016) 
Independent Chief 
Inspector of Borders 
and Immigration 
(2016) and (2017). 
Continuous 
Independent 
oversight 
None None 
 166 
  167 
                                                          
33
 The route to appeal was established by an Upper Tribunal ruling and not the DWP itself: R(CJ) and SG v 
Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2017] UKUT 324 (AAC). 
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Table 2: Comparison of social security and immigration administrative reviews and tribunal 168 
appeals, 2015-16
34
 169 
 Volumes Unit costs Average clearance times Proportion of successful 
challenges 
 Adminis
trative 
reviews 
(2017/1
8) 
Appeals 
(2015/1
6) 
Administ
rative 
reviews 
Tribunal 
appeals 
Administrative 
reviews 
Tribunal 
appeals 
Administrative 
reviews 
Tribunal 
appeals 
Social 
security 
317,000 178,818  £80 £592 13 days 125 days 15 per cent 61 per cent 
Immigration 7,000 
in-
country 
reviews
35
 
52,514 
tribunal 
appeals; 
10,000 
judicial 
reviews 
N/A 
(estimate
d cost: 
£80) 
£707 15 days 230 days 18 per cent 49 per cent 
 170 
The intention is that, by filtering our clearly wrong decisions, administrative review will 171 
reduce unnecessary tribunal appeals and the associated costs and delays. Furthermore, it is argued 172 
that administrative review will provide a more efficient and user-friendly redress mechanism than 173 
that offered by increasingly legalistic tribunals, especially in areas of mass administration. There are 174 
also arguments for administrative review from the perspective of claimants. Research into user 175 
experiences of administrative justice systems has found that people attach great importance to the 176 
timely resolution of disputes.
36
 Vulnerable people who may dispute benefit decisions likely have an 177 
acute social need. A legal model that situates claimants and public authorities as adversaries is 178 
unlikely to assist those with urgent social needs By contrast, a swift review by the public body has 179 
considerable advantages in terms of ease and efficiency and providing a better way to resolves 180 
informally without the anxiety of a hearing. For instance, a student visa appeal may take months to 181 
be heardねand conclude long after the start of the academic yearねwhereas an administrative 182 
review can take 15 days. 183 
                                                          
34
 Ministry of Justice, Tribunals Statistics Quarterly (2017); DWP, Employment and Support Allowance: Work 
Capability Assessments, Mandatory Reconsiderations and Appeals (2017); DWP, Personal Independence 
Payments: Official Statistics (2017); FOI 106180; FOI 106568; FOI 40166. 
35
 The Home Office does not collect data on administrative reviews submitted by claimants overseas and those 
in immigration detention. 
36
 Aく Bヴ┞ゲﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ‘く BWヴデｴﾗ┌Sが けSocial Security Appeals: What Do the Claimants W;ﾐデいげ ふヱΓΓΑぶ ヴ J.S.S.L. 17; G. 
‘ｷIｴ;ヴSゲﾗﾐ ;ﾐS Hく GWﾐﾐが けTヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉゲ ｷﾐ Tヴ;ﾐゲｷデｷﾗﾐげ ぷヲヰヰΑへ P.L. 116, 123. 
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The lower costs of administrative review arise from procedural differences. In tribunals, 184 
appellants attend hearings before a legally qualified tribunal judge and, in some appeals, a non-legal 185 
member (or members). By discarding costly and lengthy judicial procedures, administrative review 186 
can handle a large caseload more quickly and efficiently. Tribunal judges specialise in particular areas 187 
of administrative law whereas non-legal members bring other specialist skills, such as medical 188 
knowledge. Tribunals draw out evidence actively, through either ｷﾐケ┌ｷゲｷデﾗヴｷ;ﾉ ﾗヴ けWﾐ;Hﾉｷﾐｪげ 189 
procedures for unrepresented appellants or more adversarial hearings with represented claimants.
37
 190 
They also issue detailed reasons and decisions that can be appealed to the Upper Tribunal. By 191 
contrast, administrative review is a predominantly paper-based process typically undertaken by 192 
relatively junior officials. The reviewer will typically consider only the evidence previously submitted. 193 
In some contexts, such as social security, reviewers may contact claimants over the telephone to 194 
explain the initial decision and collect further information. Another difference is that appeals involve 195 
a complete assessment whereas administrative review is typically limited to correcting case working 196 
errors.
38
 Beneath these formal differences lie differing cultural orientations and presuppositions 197 
between independent tribunal judges and reviewers located firmly within the administration. 198 
The debate over whether the expansion of administrative review is positive or not has 199 
largely fallen into two camps: traditional scepticism and a more sanguine view. In 1989, the Council 200 
on Tribunals stated that where an administrative decision affects a citizen's liberty, livelihood, status 201 
or basic rights, then nothing less than an appeal to a properly equipped judicial and independent 202 
                                                          
37
 According to an Upper Tribunal judge, the enabling role of social security tribunals has been described as 
デｴWｷヴ け┌ﾐｷケ┌W ゲWﾉﾉｷﾐｪ ヮﾗｷﾐデげぎ “く Wヴｷｪｴデが けTｴe Impact of Austerity and Structural Reforms on the Accessibility of 
TヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉ J┌ゲデｷIWげ ｷﾐ P;ﾉﾏWヴ Wデ ;ﾉが ﾐﾗ ヲ4 above. By contrast, immigration tribunals are more adversarial. See 
ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ‘く Tｴﾗﾏ;ゲが けFヴﾗﾏ さAS┗Wヴゲ;ヴｷ;ﾉ ┗ Iﾐケ┌ｷゲｷデﾗヴｷ;ﾉざ デﾗ さAIデｷ┗Wが Eﾐ;Hﾉｷﾐｪが ;ﾐS Iﾐ┗Wゲデｷｪ;デｷ┗Wざぎ DW┗WﾉﾗヮﾏWﾐデゲ 
ｷﾐ UK TヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉゲげ ｷﾐ L. Jacobs and S. Baglay (eds), The Nature of Inquisitorial Processes in Administrative 
Regimes: Global Perspectives (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing, 2013), p.51. 
38
 There is no coherent approach as to the scope and grounds of administrative review. Immigration reviews 
;ヴW IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS ┘ｷデｴ けI;ゲW ┘ﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ Wヴヴﾗヴげ ふIﾏﾏｷｪヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ‘┌ﾉWゲが AR2.1). Homelessness reviews focus on a 
けSWaｷIｷWﾐI┞ ﾗヴ ｷヴヴWｪ┌ﾉ;ヴｷデ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;ﾉ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐげ ふTｴW AﾉﾉﾗI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa Hﾗ┌ゲｷﾐｪ ;ﾐS HﾗﾏWﾉWゲゲﾐWゲゲ ふ‘W┗ｷW┘ 
Procedures) Regulations (SI 1999/71)が ヴ Βふヲぶぶく “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ ﾏ;ﾐS;デﾗヴ┞ ヴWIﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗI┌ゲ ﾗﾐ けﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ 
Wヴヴﾗヴげ ;ﾐS けﾏｷゲデ;ﾆW ﾗa a;Iデげ ふTｴW Uﾐｷ┗Wヴゲ;ﾉ CヴWSｷデが PWヴゲﾗﾐ;ﾉ IﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIW P;┞ﾏWﾐデが JﾗHゲWWﾆWヴげゲ Aﾉﾉﾗ┘;ﾐIW ;ﾐS 
Employment and Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations (SI 2013/381), r 9)). As regards tax 
ヴW┗ｷW┘ゲが けTｴW ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ;ﾐS W┝デWﾐデ ﾗa デｴW ヴW┗ｷW┘ ;ヴW デﾗ HW ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ ;ヮヮW;ヴ ;ヮヮヴﾗヮヴｷ;デW デﾗ HM‘C ｷﾐ デｴW 
IｷヴI┌ﾏゲデ;ﾐIWゲげ ふTaxes Management Act 1970, s 49E(2) as inserted by the Transfer of Tribunal Functions and 
Revenue and Customs Appeals Order (SI 2009/56)). 
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adjudicative body would suffice.
39
 On this view, any attempt to compromise the status of appeals in 203 
whole or in part on resource grounds would be wrong in principle. Furthermore, given its lack of 204 
ｷﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIWが ;Sﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗W ヴW┗ｷW┘ Iﾗ┌ﾉS ﾐﾗデ けｷﾐ ;ﾐ┞ ゲWﾐゲW HW ヴWｪ;ヴSWS ;ゲ ; ヮヴﾗヮWヴ 205 
ゲ┌Hゲデｷデ┌デW aﾗヴ ; ヴｷｪｴデ ﾗa ;ヮヮW;ﾉげく40 By contrast, the 2001 Leggatt review of tribunals argued for the 206 
systematic use of administrative review to ensure that only the right cases would be taken to 207 
tribunals. Administrative review could be used to avoid the costs and stress of appeals and enable 208 
senior and experienced officers to identify problems in the system.
41
 According to Leggatt, 209 
administrative rW┗ｷW┘ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW ; け┗;ﾉ┌;HﾉW ┘;┞ ﾗa ｷﾏヮヴﾗ┗ｷﾐｪ ゲWヴ┗ｷIW デﾗ デｴW ヮ┌HﾉｷIげねif public bodies 210 
ﾉﾗﾗﾆWS ;デ デｴWｷヴ ﾗ┘ﾐ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ IヴｷデｷI;ﾉﾉ┞ ;ﾐS ;SﾗヮデWS デｴW けﾆｷﾐS ﾗa ｷﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐデ-mindedness and 211 
impartiality which can be expected aヴﾗﾏ デヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉゲげく42 The critical question is then not one of principle 212 
but of effectiveness. In order to assess the recent growth of administrative review, it is necessary to 213 
consider the practical operation of administrative review in areas such as social security and 214 
immigration. It is this to which we now turn. 215 
 216 
Administrative review in operation 217 
 218 
Social security mandatory reconsiderations 219 
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) makes some 12 million benefit decisions per year. 220 
Initial claims for benefits are lodged and then decided by officials. For the two principal benefits, 221 
Employment and Support Allowance and Personal Independence Payments, a health care 222 
;ゲゲWゲゲﾏWﾐデ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ﾗaデWﾐ HW ┌ﾐSWヴデ;ﾆWﾐ H┞ ; けｴW;ﾉデｴI;ヴW ヮヴﾗaWゲゲｷﾗﾐ;ﾉげ Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞WS H┞ ; Iﾗﾐデヴ;IデWS-out 223 
provider. Refused claims can be appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) 224 
                                                          
39
 Council on Tribunals, Annual Report 1989/90 (1990), [1.14]. 
40
 Council on Tribunals, Annual Report 1989/90 (1990), [1.9]. “WW ;ﾉゲﾗ ‘く “;ｷﾐゲH┌ヴ┞が けIﾐデWヴﾐ;ﾉ ‘W┗ｷW┘ゲ ;ﾐS デｴW 
WW;ﾆWﾐｷﾐｪ ﾗa “ﾗIｷ;ﾉ “WI┌ヴｷデ┞ Cﾉ;ｷﾏ;ﾐデゲげ ‘ｷｪｴデゲ ﾗa AヮヮW;ﾉげ ｷﾐ Gく ‘ｷIｴ;ヴSゲﾗﾐ ;ﾐS Hく GWﾐﾐ ふWSゲぶが Administrative 
Law & Government Action (Oxford University Press, 1994). 
41
 The Leggatt Report, Tribunals for Users: One System, One Service (2001), [9.6]. 
42
 Ibid., [9.6] and [9.8]. 
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comprised of a tribunal judge and non-legal members.
43
 In addition to appeals, the DWP has long 225 
had the power to review its own decisions.
44
 In this way, administrative review is a fundamental 226 
feature of the system given that decision-making is often based on factors に ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ 227 
circumstances, including their health and income に that can change. 228 
In 2013 the DWP introduced mandatory reconsideration with the aim of resolving disputes 229 
as early as possible and reducing unnecessary demand on tribunals. This major process change made 230 
administrative review a distinct and mandatory stage before claimants could proceed to a tribunal. 231 
The former position was that claimants seeking to challenge initial refusal decisions could appeal 232 
straightaway to the tribunal. On receipt of an appeal, the DWP would routinely review its decision. If 233 
デｴW SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐ ┘;ゲ ヴW┗ｷW┘WS ｷﾐ デｴW Iﾉ;ｷﾏ;ﾐデげゲ a;┗ﾗ┌ヴが デｴWﾐ デｴW ;ヮヮW;ﾉ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ﾉ;ヮゲWき ｷa ﾐﾗデが デｴW ;ヮヮW;ﾉ 234 
would proceed to the tribunal. However, with mandatory reconsideration, the review stage is a 235 
separate and compulsory stage in the dispute process. Claimants can now only appeal if they first 236 
request the department to reconsider its initial decision and then, second, lodge an appeal with the 237 
tribunal.
45
 In short, a one-step process has become a two-stage process. Such changes have taken 238 
place against a background of austerity and welfare reform to reduce benefit spending through 239 
stringent rules and policies, such as benefit sanctions.
46
 A controversial feature has been the 240 
outsourcing of health assessments to private companies, such as ATOS and Maximus. Such providers 241 
have been subject to criticism concerning the quality of assessments and the resulting high appeal 242 
success rates. 243 
                                                          
43
 The First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) has 1,700 judges and non-legal members. 
44
 Social Security Act 1998, ss 9 and 10. 
45
 Welfare Reform Act 2012, s 102; The Universal Credｷデが PWヴゲﾗﾐ;ﾉ IﾐSWヮWﾐSWﾐIW P;┞ﾏWﾐデが JﾗHゲWWﾆWヴげゲ 
Allowance and Employment and Support Allowance (Decisions and Appeals) Regulations (SI 2013/381). A 
concurrent change was that whereas previously claimants lodged their appeals with the DWP, appeals are now 
lodged directly with the tribunal. 
46
 Fﾗヴ ;ﾐ ﾗ┗Wヴ┗ｷW┘が ゲWW Nく Tｷﾏﾏｷﾐゲが けTｴW Cﾗ;ﾉｷデｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS “ﾗIｷWデ┞ ふIVぶぎ WWﾉa;ヴWげ ｷﾐ Aく “WﾉSﾗﾐ ;ﾐS Mく Fｷﾐﾐ ふWSゲぶが The 
Coalition Effect, 2010-2015 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); C. Beatty and S. Fothergill, 
けWelfare Reform in the United Kingdom 2010に16: Expectations, Outcomes, and Local Impactsげ ふヲヰヱΑぶ Social 
Policy and Administration (online pre-publication). On ゲ;ﾐIデｷﾗﾐゲが ゲWW Mく ASﾉWヴが けA NW┘ LW┗ｷ;デｴ;ﾐぎ BWﾐWaｷデ 
Sanctions in the Twenty-aｷヴゲデ CWﾐデ┌ヴ┞げ ふヲヰヱヶぶ ヴン Journal of Law and Society 195. 
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Between 2013 and 2017, some 300 officials (mostly at Executive Officer grade) have 244 
undertaken some 1.5 million mandatory reconsiderations. The principal advantage of the process is 245 
timeliness. Since 2014, the average monthly clearance time for mandatory reconsiderations has not 246 
exceeded 20 days.
47
 This compares with an average timeliness of appeals of 20 weeks.
48
 Given that 247 
benefits claimants have a significant interest in timely decisions on their entitlements, the shorter 248 
time taken by mandatory reconsideration is a considerable advantage. At the same time, there are 249 
various concerns with other aspects of the process. 250 
A major concern is that the two-stage nature of the processねmandatory reconsideration 251 
then appealにhas arguably weakened access to justice by deterring claimants with strong cases from 252 
proceeding to tribunals. As Figure 1 demonstrates, there has been a dramatic decline in the number 253 
of appeals lodged following the introduction of mandatory reconsideration. In 2014/15, appeal 254 
receipts were 73 percent lower compared with 2013/14.
49
 There have been other contributory 255 
factors in play here too, such as the early cancellation in 2014 of the contract with ATOS to 256 
undertake health assessments and a consequent slowdown in initial decisions.
50
 According to the 257 
DWP, the reduction in the volume of appeals is evidence that mandatory reconsideration was 258 
successful in its aim of resolving more disputes without the need for appeal.
51
 259 
 260 
[Figure 1 here] 261 
 262 
To some extent, a reduction in appeals was to be expected if the new system was working 263 
well. Mandatory reconsideration was justified in part as a filtering mechanism to reduce 264 
                                                          
47
 DWP, Employment and Support Allowance: Work Capability Assessments, Mandatory Reconsiderations and 
Appeals (2017), p.7. 
48
 Ministry of Justice, Tribunal Statistics Quarterly (2017), main tables sheet T.3. 
49
 The subsequent increase is largely accounted for by appeals lodged by claimants being transferred from 
Disability Living Allowance to Personal Independence Payments. 
50
 Jく W;ヴヴWﾐが Kく G;ヴデｴ┘;ｷデW ;ﾐS Cく B;ﾏHヴ;が けAfter Atos Healthcare: is the Employment and Support Allowance 
Fiデ Fﾗヴ P┌ヴヮﾗゲW ;ﾐS DﾗWゲ デｴW Wﾗヴﾆ C;ヮ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ AゲゲWゲゲﾏWﾐデ H;┗W ; F┌デ┌ヴWいげ ふヲヰヱヴぶ ヲΓ Disability & Society 1319. 
51
 Department for Work and Pensions, Government Response to the House of Commons Work and Pensions 
SWﾉWIデ CﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWげゲ RWヮﾗヴデ ﾗﾐ Eﾏployment and Support Allowance and Work Capability Assessment (Cmd 
8967, 2014), p.22. 
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unnecessary appeals. Such filtering, common in other redress mechanisms such as judicial review 265 
and ombudsmen, is necessary to manage caseloads. Yet, with mandatory reconsideration, the 266 
filtering is being undertaken by the same government department whose initial decisions are being 267 
challenged, prompting concerns that government may have a self-interest in discouraging claimants 268 
from pursuing their cases further.
52
 Furthermore, claimant fatigue often discourages people from 269 
challenging decisions and this is likely to be a major factor here. Vulnerable individualsねsuch as 270 
those with a long-term disability or mental illnessねoften lack the ability and confidence to pursue a 271 
challenge to a welfare bureaucracy, especially when their claim has already been rejected twice.
53
 272 
The change with mandatory reconsideration is that an individual must twice decide to challenge in 273 
order to appeal. According to Judge Robert Martin, the former Tribunal Chamber President, 274 
ﾏ;ﾐS;デﾗヴ┞ ヴWIﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ けｷゲ ﾗa S┌Hｷﾗ┌ゲ ;S┗;ﾐデ;ｪWげぎ 275 
 276 
It builds in an extra step, in that the claimant now has to make two applications: mandatory 277 
reconsideration and then appeal. It is bound to take longer. Personally, I am quite concerned that a 278 
number of claimants who may have winnable cases drop out between the mandatory reconsideration 279 
stage and deciding to make a further appeal. It seems to me to be regressive. The only value would be 280 
ｷa ﾏ;ﾐS;デﾗヴ┞ ヴWIﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ぐ ヴWゲ┌ﾉデWS ｷﾐ ; ﾏ┌Iｴ ﾏﾗヴW ヴｷｪﾗヴﾗ┌ゲ ヴW;ヮヮヴ;ｷゲ;ﾉ H┞ デｴW DWヮ;ヴデﾏWﾐデ ﾗa ｷデゲ 281 
decisions than under the old scheme.
54
 282 
 283 
There is also the related impact of taking social security out of scope for legal aid and reductions in 284 
advice services.
55
 The Upper Tribunal has expressed scepticism as to whether mandatory 285 
reconsideration has any real advantages in reducing unnecessary appeals that have merit; under the 286 
                                                          
52
 A previous empirical study found that local authority officers could use administrative review to control 
Iﾉ;ｷﾏ;ﾐデゲろ ;IIWゲゲ デﾗ デヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉゲぎ Tく E;ヴSﾉW┞ ;ﾐS ‘く “;ｷﾐゲH┌ヴ┞が けM;ﾐ;ging Appeals: The Control of Housing Benefit 
IﾐデWヴﾐ;ﾉ ‘W┗ｷW┘ゲ H┞ LﾗI;ﾉ A┌デｴﾗヴｷデ┞ OaaｷIWヴゲげ ふヱΓΓンぶ ヲヲ Journal of Social Policy 461. 
53
 S. Halliday and D. Cowan, The Appeal of Internal Review: Law, administrative justice, and the (non-) 
emergence of disputes (Oxford: Hart, 2003), pp.138-140. 
54
 Oral evidence of HH Judge Robert Martin to the House of Commons Work and Pensions Committee inquiry, 
Employment and Support Allowance and Work Capacity Benefits HC 1212 7 May 2014, Q96. 
55
 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012. 
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previous system, the department would treat an appeal as a request for a revision and review the 287 
decision before it reached the tribunal.
56
 Determined claimants can still appeal. Nonetheless, the 288 
need to make two applications to access the tribunal rather than the previous single application may 289 
well discourage vulnerable claimants with winnable cases from appealing because they find the 290 
process too onerous. As the Supreme Court recognised in Unison, impediments to access to justice 291 
can constitute a serious hindrance even if they do not make access completely impossible.
57
 292 
 Such access to justice concerns have arisen in part because of the effect of mandatory 293 
reconsideration upon the behaviour of a vulnerable group of claimants. They have also arisen by the 294 
DWP adopting the position that applications for mandatory reconsideration made out time did not 295 
generate a right of appeal to the tribunal. Instead, the Department contended, the appropriate 296 
remedy was to seek judicial review ﾗa デｴW DWPげゲ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐ ﾐﾗデ デﾗ ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘ ; ﾏ;ﾐS;デﾗヴ┞ ヴWIﾗﾐゲｷSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ 297 
out of time. However, in R (CJ) and SG v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions the Upper Tribunal 298 
ruled against the DWP holding that there was a high risk that vulnerable claimants with good claims 299 
could miss the time limits, a risk exacerbated by the reduction in advice services. According to the 300 
Upper Tribunal, tｴW IﾗﾐゲWケ┌WﾐIW ﾗa デｴW DWヮ;ヴデﾏWﾐデげゲ ;ヮヮヴﾗ;Iｴ ┘;ゲ デｴ;デ ｷデ ｴ;S ｷﾏヮヴﾗヮWヴﾉ┞ ;ゲゲ┌ﾏWS 301 
the role of gatekeeper to the tribunal system. To deny the right of appeal to claimants who made 302 
out of time applications for reconsideration would remove the right of appeal and result in a 303 
significant number of claimants entitled to benefits not receiving them.
58
 304 
 What then of the quality of reconsideration decision-making? Shortcomings had been 305 
identified in the pre-2013 reconsideration system by the then President of Appeal Tribunals. There 306 
was little consistent evidence that the DWP had been effectively reconsidering decisions before they 307 
I;ﾏW デﾗ デｴW デヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉき けoften the appeal papers show an unwillingness on the part of the decision-308 
maker to reconsider the decision in the absence of the appellant supplying fresh medical or other 309 
                                                          
56
 R (CJ) and SG v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (ESA) [2017] UKUT 0324 (AAC), [26]. 
57
 R (Unison) v Lord Chancellor [2017] 3 WLR 409, [78] (Lord Reed). 
58
 R (CJ) and SG v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions (ESA) [2017] UKUT 0324 (AAC). 
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third party evidenceげ.59 With mandatory reconsideration, the Department stated that it would 310 
ensure itゲ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ｪﾗ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ; けrobust reconsiderationげ by which decisions would be 311 
checked thoroughly and be accompanied by detailed reasons.
60
 Nevertheless, the quality of 312 
reconsideration decisions has been criticised.
61
 Tribunal Judges have expressed scepticism about the 313 
thoroughness of mandatory reconsideration and view the process as an additional administrative 314 
barrier for claimants who wish to challenge their decision rather than a substantive re-examination 315 
of the evidence.
62
 Advisers have stated that decision notices often repeat initial refusal reasons 316 
without providing any further elaboration. There is also a widely held perception that the けchances 317 
of a claimant actually having their decision revised at mandatory reconsideration stage are almost 318 
negligible to the point where most advisers and claimants view mandatory reconsideration as a 319 
aﾗヴﾏ;ﾉｷデ┞ ;ﾐS W┝ヮWIデ ; ﾐWｪ;デｷ┗W SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐくげ63 320 
As regards claimants, of all the transactions claimants have with DWP, mandatory 321 
reconsideration has the lowest satisfaction rating.
64
 Claimants have felt that new evidence 322 
submitted for a reconsideration is often ｷｪﾐﾗヴWS ;ﾐS デｴ;デ デｴW ヮヴﾗIWゲゲ ｷゲ ﾏﾗヴW ﾗa ; けヴ┌HHWヴ ゲデ;ﾏヮげ 323 
than a thorough audit of the original decision.
65
 This in turn prompts some claimants to lodge 324 
appeals against poor decisions that could have been properly resolved earlier. For instance, it is 325 
common for claimants to be awarded no entitlement points initially, to submit additional 326 
information at the reconsideration, which then confirms the initial decision, for the tribunal to then 327 
award maximum points.
66
 There are also concerns that reviewers routinely accept health care 328 
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reports from the DWPげゲ contracted-out supplier, the quality of which has been criticised,67 and 329 
disregard other evidence such as a medical report by a General Practitioner, the quality of such 330 
reports has been subject to sustained criticism. Tribunal judges have noted that they regularly see 331 
decision letters and health assessment reports at appeal hearings that have used standard or 332 
repetitive language for different functions, which in turn undermines confidence in the rigour of the 333 
original assessment.
68
 334 
 Such features are, in turn, reflected in the noticeably lower success rates for claimants at 335 
mandatory reconsideration compared with appeals (Figures 2 and 3). Of the 1.4 million 336 
reconsiderations decided between 2013-18, 20 per cent were allowed. By contrast, appeal success 337 
rates have been substantially higher: 40per cent rising to 65 per cent. What is striking here is that 338 
while mandatory reconsideration was introduced to reduce unnecessary appeals, the proportion of 339 
initial decisions overturned by tribunals has increased. 340 
 341 
[Insert Figures 2 and 3] 342 
 343 
Comparing review and tribunal outcomes is not necessarily comparing like with like because 344 
of the different cohorts of claimants. Furthermore, the wider issue as to why tribunals allow appeals 345 
is contested. The DWP has argued that appeals are often allowed because claimants submit new 346 
evidence not previously considered.
69
 Accordingly, the rate of allowed appeals is not a perfect 347 
measure of the quality of initial decisions. Nonetheless, it is one such measure. Furthermore, the 348 
high and unprecedented rate of allowed appeals に 65 per cent に confirms that the mandatory 349 
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reconsideration process is not being used to filter out appeals likely to be allowed by tribunals. On 350 
the contrary, the success rate indicates that significant improvements are required to the 351 
reconsideration process so that it can capture similar information as tribunals. At present, the 352 
mandatory reconsideration process results in a significant number of claimants not receiving 353 
benefits to which they are entitled if they do not pursue their cases to the tribunal. Further, the high 354 
proportion of allowed appeals erodes the trust of claimants and stakeholders in the system. As the 355 
Senior President of Tribunals has noted, the DWP frequently provides no justiciable defence against 356 
challenges to its decisions resulting in unnecessary appeals; the mandatory reconsideration process 357 
does nothing to improve the situation.
70
 358 
 A further area of concern relates to the wider public goods of litigation which may be 359 
obscured by the expansion of administrative review.
71
 One of the principal social purposes of 360 
administrative law litigation should be to identify ways of improving the quality of government 361 
decision-making more widely.
72
 Ideally, a redress system should have feedback-loops built in 362 
throughout to improve front-line decisions.
73
 However, there is a mismatch between the 363 
DWヮ;ヴデﾏWﾐデげゲ ;ﾏHｷデｷﾗﾐゲ ;ﾐS ;Sﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗W ヴW;ﾉｷデ┞く While the DWP ;ゲヮｷヴWゲ デﾗ ; けヴｷｪｴデ aｷヴゲデ デｷﾏWげ 364 
approach, it has struggled to raise the quality of decision-making. Staff undertaking mandatory 365 
reconsiderations are not routinely notified if their decisions are overturned by tribunals.
74
 Previous 366 
research has found that the most effective influence of tribunals was through direct practical 367 
experience by individual officials in seeing how tribunals adjudicated upon cases.
75
 The department 368 
is increasing the previously low attendance by presenting officers, but the role of tribunals has 369 
overall been diminished. 370 
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 Elsewhere in the benefits system, the problems have been more acute. The contracting-out 371 
of tax credit compliance checks to a private company, Concentrix, was marked by widespread 372 
failures in decision-making, such as official error and incorrect allegations of fraud. Vulnerable 373 
people lost benefits to which they were entitled, causing hardship. In this context, there was a 90 374 
per cent success rate through mandatory reconsideration. This was accepted by both HM Revenue 375 
and Customs and Concentrix as a routine feature of the system, but there was no focus on improving 376 
initial decisions for those people who did not seek a mandatory reconsideration.
76
 377 
 Overall, the underlying idea of having a quick and informal reconsideration of social security 378 
decisions is unobjectionable, but has been highly problematic in practice. The Social Security 379 
Advisory Committee raised concerns that mandatory reconsideration is not working as it should and 380 
made detailed recommendations.
77
 In response, the DWP has sought to improve the gathering of 381 
evidence and the quality of decision-making.
78
 In 2018, the Work and Pensions Committee, noting 382 
the renewed focus on quality, recognised that mandatory reconsideration decision making had not 383 
always been characterised by thoroughness, consistency and an emphasis on quality and that not all 384 
claimants, perhaps wrongly, been turned down at this stage, will have had the strength and 385 
resources to appeal.
79 386 
 387 
Immigration administrative reviews 388 
The Home Office decides some 3.5 million immigration applications per year to determine the 389 
immigration status of individuals against the requirements of the Immigration Rules and 390 
supplementary policies. Immigration appeals were introduced in 1971 on the basis that it was 391 
けa┌ﾐS;ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉﾉ┞ ┘ヴﾗﾐｪ ;ﾐS ｷﾐIﾗﾐゲｷゲデWﾐデ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ヴ┌le of law that power to take decisions affecting a 392 
ﾏ;ﾐげゲ ┘ｴﾗﾉW a┌デ┌ヴW ゲｴould be vested in officers of the executive, from whose findings there is no 393 
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;ヮヮW;ﾉくげ80 Given the exceptionally sensitive nature of this jurisdiction and the risks of illegitimate 394 
executive pressure, great importance has been attached to the safeguards provided by tribunals: a 395 
full re-hearing of the evidence by an independent and judicial decision-maker; adversarial hearings; 396 
detailed reasoned decisions; and onward rights of appeal. However, as pressures on the system has 397 
grown with the increase in immigration, so have the volume of appeals and associated costs.
81
 The 398 
Home Office has long seen the appeals process as an impediment to its task of enforcing 399 
immigration controls. The deeply-embedded culture within the Home Office is that vexatious 400 
appeals are often lodged by people to postpone their removal from the UK and the more delay they 401 
can induce, then the better their chances of being ultimately able to stay. Yet, the appeals process 402 
has been successful in terms of providing individuals with an effective remedy. Some 40 per cent of 403 
immigration appeals were routinely allowed. Furthermore, the courts have increasingly intervened 404 
to enhance the role of appeals.
82
 405 
Acutely aware of the obstacle to limiting overall immigration presented by tribunals, the 406 
Home Office has then endeavoured to curtail appeals as part of its drive to create a けhostile 407 
environmentげ for immigrants. In 2013, the then Home Secretary described the appeals process as け; 408 
never-ending game of sn;ﾆWゲ ;ﾐS ﾉ;SSWヴゲげ ﾗヮWﾐ デﾗ W┝ヮﾉﾗｷデ;デｷﾗﾐ H┞ aﾗヴWｷｪﾐ Iヴｷﾏｷﾐ;ﾉゲが ｷﾏﾏigrants, and 409 
their lawyers to delay the enforcement of immigration law.
83
 In 2014, all existing and long-standing 410 
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immigration appeal rights (except on asylum and human rights grounds) were replaced with 411 
administrative review.
84
 This was estimated to save £261 million over 10 years.
85
 412 
 Given the toxic politics of immigration, replacing appeals with administrative review was 413 
widely viewed by immigration lawyers as another way of undermining fairness for applicants, 414 
reinforcing a deep-seated mutual distrust between them and the Home Office. Intense concerns 415 
were also raised in Parliament. It was argued that administrative review was not being introduced to 416 
secure fairness and justice for refused immigrants, but to reduce the number who would have 417 
succeeded had they been able to put their case to a tribunal.
86
 The Joint Committee on Human 418 
Rights invoked the well-known dictum of Hale LJ: けぷｷへﾐ デｴｷゲ S;┞ ;ﾐS ;ｪW ; ヴｷｪｴデ ﾗa ;IIWゲゲ デﾗ ; デヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉ 419 
or other adjudicative mechanism established by the state is just as important and fundamental as a 420 
ヴｷｪｴデ ﾗa ;IIWゲゲ デﾗ デｴW ﾗヴSｷﾐ;ヴ┞ Iﾗ┌ヴデゲくげ87 Accordingly, withdrawing appeals would undermine the 421 
common law right of access to justice.
88
 The Home Office was implacable: only fundamental rights 422 
cases justified the expense and delay of an appeal. Immigration decisions did not fall within the right 423 
to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR).
89
 The Home Office did not recognise the notion of an overarching 424 
common law right of access to justice over and above primary legislation. The result is that only 425 
around 12 per cent of the 3.5 million immigration decisions per year now attract a right of appeal. 426 
Nonetheless, the Home Office had admitted that the high appeal success rate was largely 427 
attributable to its own errors: approximately 60 per cent of appeals were allowed due to casework 428 
errors.
90
 Aゲ ﾗﾐW MP ﾐﾗデWSが けデｴW Gﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ デｴｷゲ ｴｷｪｴ ﾏ;ヴｪｷﾐ ﾗa Wヴヴﾗヴ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ デﾗ ゲWWﾆ デﾗ 429 
improve the quality of their decision making, but rather デﾗ ヴWS┌IW デｴW ﾗヮヮﾗヴデ┌ﾐｷデｷWゲ aﾗヴ Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWげく91 430 
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This made little difference to the political juggernaut. Indeed, the Home Office had the chutzpah to 431 
;ヴｪ┌W デｴ;デ デｴW SWﾉ;┞ゲ ;ﾐS Iﾗゲデゲ ﾗa ;ヮヮW;ﾉゲ ┘WヴW けﾐﾗデ a;ｷヴ デﾗ ;ヮヮﾉｷI;ﾐデゲげく92 432 
 Previous administrative review processes in the immigration context have been widely 433 
criticised. Reviews had been characterised by boilerplate reasons, inconsistencies, and carelessness 434 
and were ineffective in identifying errors.
93
 In 2004, only one per cent of reviews succeeded for 435 
claimants compared with 40 per cent of appeals.
94
 According to the then Independent Monitor, the 436 
Home Office needed to improve the quality of reviews.
95
 Unsurprisingly, the Home Office 437 
subsequently gave its administrative review system a clean bill of health.
96
 Despite such concerns, 438 
reviews operated largely against the safety-net of appeals. By contrast, the 2014 changes marked a 439 
clean break with appeals and the withdrawal of this safeguard. Remaining appeals on human rights 440 
grounds will, in future, increasingly take place out of country.
97
 441 
To meet concerns over the abolition of appeals, ministers gave assurances.
98
 Administrative 442 
reviews would be undertaken by fully trained and experienced staff who would be independent of 443 
the original decision-maker and located in a separate operational unit. Feedback mechanisms would 444 
be established. The Home Office would also monitor the overturn rate on administrative review and 445 
investigate any discrepancy with the appeal success rate.
99
 In practice, none of these assurances 446 
were kept. The Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration found that administrative reviews were 447 
being undertaken by low-level, untrained, and temporary staff with limited or no experience of 448 
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immigration law, a notoriously complex area.
100
 Quality assurance was minimal and ineffectual. Valid 449 
applications had been incorrectly rejected and this had not been picked up. To ensure a degree of 450 
independence, in-country reviewers had been organised into a functionally separate unit from initial 451 
decision-makers, but the unit had been staffed with junior and inexperienced officials. Complex 452 
cases were not referred upwards to more senior caseworkers. By contrast, overseas reviewers 453 
worked alongside primary decision-makers; although there was no evidence of bias, it was more 454 
difficult to demonstrate that reviewers were truly independent. 455 
As regards the quality of review decisions, administrative reasons must be proper, adequate, 456 
intelligible, and deal with the substantial points raised.
101
 In practice, review decisions have been 457 
Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴｷゲWS H┞ け;ﾐ ﾗ┗Wヴ-ヴWﾉｷ;ﾐIW ﾗﾐ デｴW ｷﾐｷデｷ;ﾉ ヴWa┌ゲ;ﾉ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐ ﾉWデデWヴげ ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ ;SSヴWゲゲｷﾐｪ デｴW 458 
;ヮヮﾉｷI;ﾐデげゲ ヮﾗｷﾐデゲ ﾗa Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪWく102 Perfunctory review notices that merely reiterate initial refusal 459 
reasons do not comprise an effective review.
103
 Another constraining factor is that fresh evidence 460 
will normally be disregarded irrespective of its importance.
104
 Success rates have been lower - far 461 
lower - than those of appeals. Some 49 per cent of appeals allowed under the former regime. The 462 
Home Office had concluded that 60 per cent of allowed appeals succeeded due to case-working 463 
errors. By contrast, in 2015-16, the success rate was eight per cent for in-country reviews and 22 per 464 
cent for at the border reviews.
105
 In 2016/17, the success rate was 3.4 per cent for in-country 465 
reviews and 6.8 per cent for border reviews.
106
 Assurances that such discrepancies would be 466 
investigated were unfulfilled - as were promises of feedback loops to improve initial decision-467 
making. The only assurance met was that reviews would be processed within 28 days. 468 
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On top of this, the replacement of appeals with reviews reveals a wider flawed design. 469 
Without appeals, recourse to judicial review becomes more likely. However, for challenging 470 
individualised decisions, judicial review does not provide as effective a remedy as an appeal.
107
 471 
TヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉゲ ┌ﾐSWヴデ;ﾆW ; a┌ﾉﾉ W┝;ﾏｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW a;Iデ┌;ﾉ ;ﾐS ﾉWｪ;ﾉ H;ゲｷゲ ﾗa ;ﾐ ｷﾐSｷ┗ｷS┌;ﾉげゲ I;ゲWく TｴWｷヴ 472 
decisions are final, subject to any onward challenge. The inability of the judicial review court to 473 
engage in fact-aｷﾐSｷﾐｪ ﾗヴ デﾗ ゲ┌Hゲデｷデ┌デW SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ ヴWﾐSWヴゲ ｷデ ;ﾐ けWﾐデｷヴWﾉ┞ ┌ﾐゲ;デｷゲa;Iデﾗヴ┞げ ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏ aﾗヴ 474 
determining individual fact-sensitive issues.
108
 Judicial review only enables the court to quash a 475 
decision on relatively narrow grounds. It is also more costly, takes longer than appeals, and the 476 
Upper Tribunal currently has a high caseload.
109
 477 
The suspicions of immigration lawyersにthat the Home Office cannot be trusted to mark its 478 
own homeworkにhave effectively been confirmed by poor implementation. The Chief Inspector of 479 
Borders and Immigration has concluded that there was けthere was significant room for improvement 480 
in respect of the effectiveness of administrative review in identifying and correcting case working 481 
Wヴヴﾗヴゲが ;ﾐS ｷﾐ Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷI;デｷﾐｪ SWIｷゲｷﾗﾐゲ デﾗ ;ヮヮﾉｷI;ﾐデゲげく110 Even the normally defensive Home Office 482 
accepted that けケ┌;ﾉｷデ┞ ｴ;ゲ ﾐﾗデ IﾗﾐゲｷゲデWﾐデﾉ┞ HWWﾐ ﾗa デｴW ゲデ;ﾐS;ヴS デﾗ ┘ｴｷIｴ ┘W ;ゲヮｷヴWげ ;ﾐS ﾉ;ヴｪWﾉ┞ 483 
accepted the recommendations made.
111
 A subsequent investigation found some improvements by 484 
the Home Office.
112
 Yet, it also found that the Home Office had been unable to demonstrate that it 485 
had delivered an efficient, effective, and cost-saving replacement for the previous appeals 486 
mechanisms.
113
 There continue to be serious weaknesses remaining in respect of reason-giving, the 487 
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lack of a dedicated team for overseas reviews, and the variable level of quality assurance for 488 
overseas and border reviews. In its response to the report, the Home Office, noting that in-country 489 
reviews have improved, accepted that progress has been slower for reviews undertaken overseas 490 
and at the border. 491 
 492 
Does administrative review enhance or weaken administrative justice? 493 
The basic test of administrative justice is whether the qualities of a decision-making process provide 494 
arguments for the acceptability of its decisions.
114
 Acceptability implies trust and confidence.
115
 The 495 
above examination of different administrative review schemes presents a highly mixed picture. 496 
There are pockets of good practice. It is also apparent that some individual claimants may well feel 497 
that their particular cases were handled satisfactorily regardless of weaknesses in the wider 498 
administrative review system. Nonetheless, there are serious concerns concerning the operation of 499 
some administrative review schemes, in particular mandatory reconsideration and immigration 500 
reviews. In principle, administrative review could provide a swift and effective review of a decision, 501 
but in practice, the quality of review procedures and decision outcomes is highly variable. Success 502 
rates are substantially lower than those of tribunals. Mandatory reconsideration seems to deter 503 
many benefit claimants from pursuing their case to a tribunal. Immigration appeals have been 504 
largely abolished. There is little evidence that administrative review has raised the quality of initial 505 
decisions. Many of the legitimising qualities of tribunalsにjudicial procedures; independent, judicial 506 
and specialist decision-makers; and better reasoned decisionsにhave effectively been jettisoned for 507 
little in return. In light of such features, it is unlikely that many claimants would have confidence in 508 
administrative review as an adequate remedy.  It might be objected that this analysis is misplaced: 509 
administrative review will inevitably be seen as inferior when compared with tribunals. But, given 510 
the relative importance of decisions, everyone ought to be able to expect a good decision to 511 
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determine their entitlements. It is important not to allow the search for the best to defeat the good 512 
but, to be effective, redress procedures must achieve minimum standards. 513 
Even from a more sanguine view of the new administrative review, the practical effect of 514 
administrative review has still been to weaken the ability of people to secure effective redress. 515 
Process does not wholly determine outcome. Nevertheless, procedural restrictions are likely to have 516 
substantive effects thereby worsening the position for claimants.
116
 The risk is that fewer claimants 517 
now qualify because of the shift from tribunals to administrative review. Administrative review has 518 
also weakened public accountability of government. The transparency and openness of independent 519 
tribunal scrutiny has been significantly reduced. Indeed, it has been argued that the real attraction 520 
of administrative review is that it enables government to conceal from public view the full 521 
inadequacies of initial decision-making.
117
 Another wider consequence is that the proliferation of 522 
different administrative review schemes represents another likely source of confusion to the public 523 
in its understanding of the administrative justice system: the subtle though crucial dichotomy 524 
between appeals and complaints is not widely appreciated by the public and liable to confuse.
118
 525 
Administrative review adds a further set of distinctions likely to exacerbate the problem. On the 526 
basis of the way the systems have been implemented, the recent expansion of administrative review 527 
is, in essence, a problematic response to the judicialisation of tribunals. 528 
Enhancing the quality of administrative review is then required. Indeed, the Law Commission 529 
is to undertake a law reform project on administrative review.
119
 We suggest that the following 530 
reforms are worthy of consideration. First, to ensure their independence and to insulate them from 531 
political and administrative pressures, administrative review systems need to be separate and 532 
autonomous from initial decision-making institutions. Second, reviews should be undertaken by 533 
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specialist and expert reviewers with experience of initial decision-making. Such reviewers need 534 
specialist training in the essential aspects of decision-making: fact-gathering and assessment; using 535 
inquisitorial procedures effectively; and reason-giving. At present, government departments have 536 
complete control of both initial and review decisions and procedures. In this respect, the refusal of 537 
both the DWP and the Home Office to allow continuous independent and external oversight of the 538 
operation of their review procedures is an unfortunate missed opportunity to promote public 539 
confidence.
120
 Third, government bodies need to take more responsibility for promoting the quality 540 
of both procedures and decision outcomes. At present, some claimants experience unnecessary 541 
difficulty in attaining their entitlements. This is self-defeating as it undermines the legitimacy of 542 
government. Government must ensure that the quality of procedures and decisions has equal 543 
priority as speed and cost. To this end, government needs to invest in developing adjudication as a 544 
decision-making technique and embed a culture of adjudication within the administrative review 545 
process in order to raise and maintain the quality of decision-making. Another option would be to 546 
make government departments themselves to pay the costs of allowed appeals. More generally, 547 
there needs to be commitment to the principle of systematic improvement to enhance the quality of 548 
both review processes and decisions. The flaw of current review processes is that it is possible to 549 
replicate the same quality as tribunals on the cheap. The fate of such proposals of course rests with 550 
government itself taking the initiative.
121
 551 
 552 
Administrative review, judicial power and the separation of powers 553 
In this final part of the article, we consider the implications of the expansion of administrative review 554 
and the corresponding displacement of tribunals for the wider understanding of the public law 555 
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system. In particular, we consider what insights this experience offers in respect of the debate on 556 
judicial power and the separation of powers within the UK constitution. 557 
 In recent years, public law scholars in the UK have observed how the power of judges to 558 
review government decisions has increased.
122
 There are many examples commonly offered in 559 
support of observations, such as the development of common law rights jurisprudence and the 560 
enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998. The fear of some is that the courts are progressively 561 
trespassing beyond their appropriate constitutional and institutional boundaries, and becoming too 562 
involve in what are essentially けpolicyげ decisions that ought to be taken by other decision-makers.123 563 
This broad concern has been given even greater prominence voice by the Judicial Power Project.
124
 564 
The founders of the Project, and those who have expressed similar concerns, have regularly based 565 
their arguments uヮ ; ヴWIﾗﾐゲデヴ┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa JAG Gヴｷaaｷデｴげゲ political constitution thesis, claiming that the 566 
UKげゲ デヴ;Sｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ヴヴ;ﾐｪWﾏWﾐデ, which placed emphasis on political controls on power, 567 
are being supplanted by an emphasis on legal constitutionalism.
125
 The concern is that judicial power 568 
is usurping political and democratic powerねbreaching the separation of powers126 and creating a 569 
さﾃ┌ヴｷゲデﾗIヴ;I┞くざ127 While there have been volumes written on the topic of judicial power in the past 570 
few years alone, the significant dismantling of judicial control of government effected through the 571 
expansion of administrative review and the displacement of tribunals has been entirely absent from 572 
this debate. 573 
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 The growth of administrative review is a clear demonstration of how judicial power has 574 
changed in multiple directions in recent years. While there has no doubt been an expansion of legal 575 
principle is some areas of public law, developments with administrative review shows how effective 576 
judicial control has also been removed and marginalised in other areas. This prompts questions 577 
about how power is understood in the debate around judicial power. The mainstream debate often 578 
takes power to mean the contours of legal doctrine as explained by judges, usually those judges 579 
sitting in appellate courts. This is an important metric. Yet, judicial power can also, and should also, 580 
be understood on the basis of what power is actually exercised over government. On this approach, 581 
the growth of administrative review is one of the most significant developments in judicial power in 582 
recent years. Far from being part of a rising さjuristocracy,ざ the powers of some parts of the tribunal 583 
judiciaryねthose that have been effectively or legally displaced by administrative reviewねoccupy a 584 
relatively precarious position within the UKげゲ constitutional framework. That is to say, they are a 585 
form of judicial control on administrative power that is insecure and subject to being significantly 586 
affected by the political and economic pressures that influence government policy. 587 
The rise of administrative review also provokes reflection on the nature of the separation of 588 
powers more generally. Increasingly, the principle is held out as significant within the UK 589 
constitution.
128
 In contrast to the idea of さchecks and balancesざ under the separation of powers, 590 
recent changes to administrative review stand as a clear example of the ability of government to 591 
reshape fundamentallyねin both design and effectねits own procedures and external dispute 592 
mechanisms, with little input or oversight from Parliament. Indeed, it underlines the huge amount of 593 
power inherent in positions occupied by government as designer, operator, and participant of the 594 
administrative justice system. From this perspective, the growth of administrative review in social 595 
security and immigration represents a form of capture of the justice system by which government 596 
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departments have extended their own dispute resolution systems at the expense of public justice 597 
systems.  598 
The performance of administrative review systems continues to receive insufficient 599 
attention from Parliament. The main external check on the performance of the administrative 600 
review systems have been reports by the Social Security Advisory Committee and the Independent 601 
Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, which recommended detailed reforms. Some, though 602 
far from all, of proposed reforms have been accepted. Such a state of affairs provides further 603 
ゲ┌ヮヮﾗヴデ デﾗ ‘┌Hｷﾐげゲ デｴWゲｷゲ デｴ;デが ｷﾐ デｴW IﾗﾐデW┝デ ﾗa デｴW ﾏﾗSWヴﾐ ;Sﾏｷﾐｷゲデヴ;デｷ┗W ゲデ;デWが the account of 604 
ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデ ┘W SWヴｷ┗W aヴﾗﾏ デｴW Iﾉ;ゲゲｷI ゲWヮ;ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ヮﾗ┘Wヴゲ ﾏWデ;ヮｴﾗヴ ﾗa さデｴヴWW Hヴ;ﾐIｴWゲざ IｴWIﾆｷﾐｪ 605 
and balancing seems out of place and out of time.
129
 Instead, it reminds us that it is vital to move 606 
beyond conceptualisations of state based on a tripartite separation of powers mode and think more 607 
IﾉﾗゲWﾉ┞ ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW IﾗﾏヮﾉW┝ さﾐWデ┘ﾗヴﾆゲざ of accountability that give shape to the state and the justice 608 
system. 609 
Finally, despite much discussion concerning the growth of judicial power, the courts appear 610 
reluctant to intervene meaningfully in the operation of administrative review systems. The courts 611 
have recognised that administrative review is a markedly less favourable remedy than tribunal 612 
appeals.
130
 The courts have also undertaken wide-ranging interventions in the operation of judicial 613 
procedures on the ground of systemic inherent unfairness.
131
 However, they appear reluctant to 614 
inquire into how an administrative process handles a mass caseload.
132
 Article 6 ECHR right to a fair 615 
trial offers no scope for intervention in the immigration context, but has some potential bite in the 616 
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social security context.
133
 The long-established curative principle, that access to judicial reviewねas 617 
opposed to an appealねis sufficient to remedy administrative unfairness, has increasingly been 618 
doubted. The Upper Tribunal and the higher courts have emphasised the advantages of appeals over 619 
judicial review when expanding immigration appeals and, in the social security context, to prevent 620 
the mandatory reconsideration time limit from reducing access to tribunals.
134
 There are also 621 
indications that a putative common law jurisprudence on access to justice could provide a basis for 622 
judicial intervention, though this is only ever likely to shave off some particularly sharp edges.
135
 623 
Overall, the recent experience with administrative review exposes a very different side to 624 
recent debates about judicial power and the separation of powers within the UK constitution. 625 
Instead of the expanded powers wielded by a juristocracy, this is evidence of significant curtailing of 626 
judicial control of government. Instead of effective Parliamentary oversight and control of 627 
administrative power, we see administration redesigning and controlling its own redress system 628 
while being subject to minimal scrutiny from the legislature. Finally, we see that the courts have only 629 
limited power to influence the operation of administrative review system which, on examination, 630 
can have adverse consequences for administrative justice. 631 
 632 
Conclusions 633 
This article has considered the recent rapid growth of administrative review through detailed studies 634 
of social security and immigration review processes. This experience reflects a wider and inherent 635 
predicament of contemporary justice systems. All justice processes face a fundamental trade-off 636 
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between the need for fairness and efficiency.
136
 People want an authentic and credible means for 637 
resolving their disputes which are of high-quality, effective, timely, and use fair procedures. In 638 
practice, formal legal procedures tend to be costly. Increases in cases produce backlogs and delays, 639 
and ultimately often frustrate the immediate political ends governments is striving for. In response, 640 
the government has been seeking to formulate policy responses to cost and delay. One response has 641 
been to attempt reduce demand on formal legal procedures. Other responses include streamlining 642 
formal legal procedures or diverting disputes into ancillary alternative processes. The basic problem 643 
is that such alternative processes typically, though not necessarily, lack the authenticity and 644 
effectiveness of formal legal procedures and tend to weaken public confidence.  645 
 In principle, administrative review could be an advantageous way of seeking to resolve 646 
disputes quickly, at lower cost, and with less anxiety for individuals than appearing before tribunals. 647 
However, drawing upon a range of empirical evidence, we have demonstrated that the operation of 648 
administrative review in practiceねat least in the contexts we have discussedねis characterised by 649 
multiple problems. It has found that the expansion of administrative review tends to reduce both 650 
access to justice and the quality of decision-making. Overall, there is a lack of independence and 651 
impartiality in how reviews are undertaken. There is variation in the way evidence is handled and in 652 
how review decisions are made. Administrative review success rates of administrative review are far 653 
lower than those of tribunals. There is a considerable difference between a review as a quick check 654 
as to whether the initial decision was wrong compared with a full de novo judicial fact-finding 655 
assessment. The insertion of administrative review has either withdrawn access to tribunals or made 656 
such access more difficultねdisplacing tribunals and curtailing judicial control of government. These 657 
shortcomings severely limit the effectiveness of administrative review. The overall outcome is a 658 
negative one for individuals in terms seeking access to justice to obtain their legal entitlements. At 659 
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least in its present form, the development of administrative review represents a significant 660 
deterioration in the quality of administrative justice system.  661 
 Pﾉ;IWS ┘ｷデｴｷﾐ デｴW ┘ｷSWヴ IﾗﾐデW┝デ ﾗa デｴW UKげゲ Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ヴヴ;ﾐｪWﾏWﾐデゲが デｴW デ;ﾉW ﾗa 662 
administrative review told here offer a contrasting narrative to that at the centre of recent debates 663 
on judicial power and the separation of powers. This is a tale of de-judicialisation at a time when the 664 
dominant focus is on the expansion of judicial power that is placed in the hands of an elite class of 665 
judge. The growth of administrative review and the corresponding displacement of tribunals is 666 
highlight how some parts of the judiciary occupy a positon that is liable to being heavily affected by 667 
economic and policy changes. 668 
 A final, forward-looking word is needed on the digital transformation programme being 669 
implemented by the Ministry of Justice and the status of administrative review in light of those 670 
reforms.
137
 The board intention is to transform tribunals by making them digital by default, in order 671 
to improve both efficiency and access to justice. In the social security context, physical tribunal 672 
hearings are to be largely, though not fully, replaced by continuous online hearings in which 673 
appellants interact with the tribunal through an online messaging service. Appeals handled online 674 
would be resolved much more quickly than the current average of 20 weeks. In the immigration 675 
context, greater use will be made of video link hearings. With the advent of online tribunal 676 
procedures, the distinction between administrative review and tribunal procedures may again be 677 
reconsidered: it makes little sense to operate paper-based administrative review procedures while 678 
simultaneously introducing online tribunal hearings. There are many questions and concerns about 679 
these reforms
138
 and reintroducing appeals via a new online approach would likely increase the 680 
caseload of tribunals, but doing so would also likely enable swifter and better quality decisions than 681 
that currently provided by administrative review. Such a step would follow a logic that pursues the 682 
enhancement of administrative justice. However, as highlighted above, the digitalisation of tribunals 683 
                                                          
137
 Sir ErﾐWゲデ ‘┞SWヴが “Wﾐｷﾗヴ PヴWゲｷSWﾐデ ﾗa TヴｷH┌ﾐ;ﾉゲが けTｴW Modernisation of Access to Justice in Times of 
A┌ゲデWヴｷデ┞げ ふ5th
 
Annual Ryder Lecture, University of Bolton, 3 March 2016). 
138
 R. Thomas and J. Tomlinson, The Digitalisation of Tribunals: What we know and what we need to know 
(Public Law Project and UK Administrative Justice Institute, 2018). 
35 
 
ｷゲ デｴW Mｷﾐｷゲデヴ┞ ﾗa J┌ゲデｷIWげゲ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ デｴW WIﾗﾐﾗﾏｷI ;ﾐS ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ IｷヴI┌ﾏゲデ;ﾐIWゲ ｷﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｷデゲ aｷﾐSゲ 684 
itself, while administrative review was the response of other departmentsねnamely, the Home 685 
Office and DWP. It would be naïve to suggest the Ministry of Justice ongoing reform project will be 686 
the breakthrough moment where a joined-up approach to administrative justice system-design is 687 
deployed, when that has not been the case so far. Nevertheless, it does indicate that there is a need 688 
to reform the effectiveness of justice processes and this should be focused exclusively on tribunals 689 
and courts. Given the increasing prominence of administrative review as either a substitute to or a 690 
mandatory stage prior to appeals and the concerns raised, the effectiveness and quality of review 691 
processes also require improvement. 692 
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 698 
Note: this Figure shows the number of social security appeals decided, allowed, and dismissed. Source: Ministry 699 
of Justice, Tribunals and Gender Recognition Statistics Quarterly (2018). 700 
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 703 
 704 
Note: this figure shows the number of mandatory reconsiderations decided and those allowed in favour of 705 
claimants. The data is taken from: Source: DWP, Employment and Support Allowance: Work Capability 706 
Assessments, Mandatory Reconsiderations and Appeals (2018); DWP, Personal Independence Payments: 707 
Official Statistics (2018). 708 
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Figure 2: Mandatory reconsiderations, 2013-18 
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 710 
 711 
Note: this Figure shows the proportion of social security appeals allowed by the First-tier Tribunal (Social 712 
Entitlement) Chamber and the proportion of mandatory reconsiderations allowed in favour of claimants. 713 
Sources: DWP, Employment and Support Allowance: Work Capability Assessments, Mandatory 714 
Reconsiderations and Appeals (2018); DWP, Personal Independence Payments: Official Statistics (2018); 715 
Ministry of Justice, Tribunals and Gender Recognition Statistics Quarterly (2018). 716 
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Figure 3: Mandatory reconsideration and tribunal success rates, 2013-18 
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